· Πώς η Ρωσία ξεπέρασε τις δυτικές κυρώσεις ή πώς δεν μαθαίνει η Δύση..
·
Πώς
η Ρωσία ξεπέρασε τις δυτικές κυρώσεις ή πώς δεν μαθαίνει η Δύση..
Το πιο ευδιάκριτο
σημείο αξιολόγησης των δυτικών προθέσεων τζαι ελπίδων στην Ουκρανική διαμάχη
ήταν η στρατηγική οικονομικής απομόνωσης της Ρωσίας, μέσω των κυρώσεων. Οι
δυτικοί ηγέτες ήταν πανηγυρικά ξεκάθαροι για τις προσδοκίες τους..
Θκυο χρονιά συν, μετα,
η εικόνα εν ξεκάθαρη για την αποτυχία της Δύσης... Οικονομικά, η Ρωσία όχι μόνο
έχει οικονομική ανάπτυξη, ξεπερνώντας τζαι στις ευρωπαϊκές χώρες, αλλα όπως
καταγράφει η πιο κάτω ανάλυση, η Ρωσία ανέπτυξε τζαι αναπτύσσει με επιτάχυνση
έργα, τα οποία δημιουργούν ασιατικούς διαδρόμους για την μεταφορά αγαθών τζι
πρώτων υλών...
Τζαι τούτα τα δίκτυα
δημιουργούν ουσιαστικά ένα είδος διασύνδεσης, η οποία αφήνει εκτός την Δύση. Όϊ
μόνο σαν συμμετοχή, αλλά τζαι σαν ντε φάκτο αποκλεισμός από τους νέους
γεωγραφικά ασιατικούς διαδρόμους επικοινωνίας τζαι εμπορίου...
Μερικά που τούτα τα
έργα υπήρχαν σαν πλάνα προηγουμένως, αλλά η φάση του πολέμου, η οποία για την
Ρωσία βιώθηκε τζαι βιώνεται, σαν ζήτημα γεωπολιτικής αυτονομίας που την Δύση,
επιταχύνει τα έργα σαν «προϊόντα της ανάγκης» πκιον...
Η αποτυχημένη απόπειρα
των δυτικών, εν ήταν όμως κάτι μη προβλέψιμο... Η ιδέα των κυρώσεων έτσι τζαι
αλλιώς εν επέτυχε σε ανατροπές καθεστώτων τζαι αλλού προηγουμένως στην εποχή
μας... Τζαι υπάρχει τζαι το ιστορικό παράδειγμα της Γερμανίας τζαι της Ιαπωνίας
στον Μεσοπόλεμο... Οι κυρώσεις έχουν σαν συνέπεια την κατασκευή μηχανισμών
[τζαι τεχνολογική επένδυση τζαι δημιουργικότητα] αντιμετώπισης των ελλειμάτων.
Ουσιαστικά, η υπερχρηση των κυρώσεων οδηγά στην απώλεια επιρροής τζήνων που τα
επιβάλουν μακροχρόνια...
«Invention is the mother of
necessity, and Russia’s response to largely Western-imposed economic and trade
sanctions has shown the extent of that inventiveness. While enduring
attritive punishment in its Ukraine campaign, the war remains sustainable for
the Kremlin. The domestic economy has not collapsed, despite
apocalyptic predictions to the contrary. In terms of exports, Russia
is carving out new trade routes, a move that has been welcomed by notable
powers in the Global South.
One of the chief prosecutors of
sanctions against Moscow was initially confident about the damage that would be
caused by economic bludgeoning. US President Joe Biden, in February
2022, insisted on
the imposition of measures that would “impair [Russia’s] ability to compete in
a high-tech 21st century economy.” The Council of
the European Union also explained that
the move was intended to weaken Moscow’s “ability to finance the war and
specifically target the political, military and economic elite responsible for
the invasion [of Ukraine].”
In all this, the European Union,
the United States and other governments have ignored a salient historical
lesson when resorting to supposedly punitive formulae intended to either deter
Russia from pursuing a course of action or depriving it of necessary
resources. States subject to supposedly crushing economic measures
can adapt, showing streaks of impressive resilience. The response
from Japan, Germany and Italy during the 1930s in the face of sanctions imposed
by the League of Nations provide irrefutable proof of that
proposition. All, to a certain extent, pursued what
came to be known as Blockadefestigkeit,
or blockade resilience. With bitter irony, the targeted powers also
felt emboldened to pursue even more aggressive measures to subvert the
restraints placed upon them.
By the end of 2022, Russia had
become China’s second biggest supplier of Russian crude oil. India
has also been particularly hungry for Russian oil. Producing only
10% of domestic supply, Russia contributed 34%
of the rest of Indian oil consumption in 2023.
Trade routes are also being
pursued with greater vigour than ever. This year, progress was made
between Russia and China on a North Sea Route, which straddles the Atlantic
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, running from Murmansk on the Barents Sea to the
Bering Strait and the Far East. ...
While that agreement will operate to Russia’s
frozen north, another transport route has also received a boosting
tonic. Of late, Moscow and New Delhi have been making progress on
the 7,200-kilometre International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which
will run from St. Petersburg in northwestern Russia to ports in southern Iran
for onward movement to Mumbai. While the agreement between Russia,
Iran and India for such a multimodal corridor dates back to September 2000, the
advent of sanctions imposed in the aftermath of the Ukraine War propelled
Moscow to seek succour in the export markets of the Middle East and Asia. As
staff writers at Nikkei point out, the
shipping route will not only bypass Europe but be “less than half as long as
the current standard path through the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez
Canal.” ....
Despite the frightful losses being endured in
the Russia-Ukraine war, it is clear, at least when it comes to using economic
and financial weapons, that Moscow has prevailed. It has outfoxed
its opponents, and, along the way, sought to redraw global trade routes that
will furnish it with even greater armour from future economic
shocks. Other countries less keen to seek a moral stake in the
Ukraine conflict than pursue their own trade interests, have been most
enthusiastic.»
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